Introduction
This article explicates a logic of comparative support relations of the form "conclusion C 1 is supported by premises P 1 at least as strongly as conclusion C 2 is supported by premises P 2 ", abbreviated "C 1 |P 1 ≽ C 2 |P 2 ". This logic is a generalization of the logic of comparative conditional probability first developed by B. O. Koopman (1940) . The version of the logic on offer here contains several innovations. Its axioms will not presuppose deductive logic. Rather, classical logical entailment will fall out as a special case of comparative support. Furthermore, these comparative support relations turn out to be the qualitative conditional probabilistic analogs of the conditional probability functions known as Popper functions. As a result, this logic can capture all of the features of Bayesian confirmation theory. Thus, this logic of comparative support provides a foundation for the notion of evidential support that underlies both classical deductive logic and probabilistic inductive logic. Along the way I'll provide background on the nature of the Popper functions, including a particularly spare axiomatization of the Popper functions that won't presuppose deductive logic.
Let's begin with some background on logics of comparative probability. For some applications numerical probability values are unimportant, and may even seem inappropriate. In such cases the usefulness of probability functions may only derive from their ability to represent a probabilistic ordering among possible states of affairs -i.e. that some states of affairs are more probable (or more plausible) than others. In such cases the use of numerical probability functions may seem objectionable because the precise numerical values appear to be meaningless. This may give rise to philosophical objections to the use of probabilities in these contexts. Comparative probability relations provide a way to sidestep objections to precise numerical values. They provide the desired probabilistic orderings without drawing on numerical values.
The version of comparative probability relations on offer here will take conditional probability as basic. Unconditional probabilities may be represented by conditional probabilities in which the condition is a tautology. Just as many distinct conditional probability functions P satisfy the axioms of probability theory, there will be many distinct comparative conditional probability relations ≽ that satisfy the axioms I'll provide for comparative conditional probability relations. Each comparative conditional probability relation is a weak partial order on pairs of sentences (i.e. it is a transitive and reflexive relation). Each such relation takes the form A|B ≽ C|D, which may be read to say, "A given B is at least as probable as C given D". Furthermore, each relation ≽ that satisfies the following axioms will turn out to correspond to a kind of numerical conditional probability function called a Popper function. Popper functions are numerical probability functions that take conditional probabilities as basic, rather than defining conditional probability in terms of unconditional probability. It will turn out that for each numerical Popper function P, there is a corresponding comparative conditional probability relation ≽ (satisfying the following axioms) that agrees with P -i.e. for all sentences A, B, C, D, whenever the probabilistic relationship P[A | B]  P[C | D] holds, the corresponding qualitative relationship A|B ≽ C|D holds. Furthermore, it turns out that each comparative conditional probability relation ≽ that satisfies our axioms can be represented by some numerical Popper function that provides the same comparative probability ordering among possible states of affairs. That is, a representation theorem will establish that for each comparative conditional probability relation ≽ that satisfies (a version of) our axioms, there is a corresponding Popper function P such that for all sentences A, B, C, D, whenever the qualitative relationship A|B ≽ C|D holds, the corresponding probabilistic relationship P[A | B]  P[C | D] holds. Thus, comparative probability relations are robust enough to provide all of the structure engendered by numerical probability functions in placing orderings among possible states of affairs. Indeed, we will find that some kinds of comparative probability relations can represent probabilistic ordering structures of a non-Archimedean kind not captured by numerical probability functions.
The axiomatic system I'll present is purely formal, so the notion of comparative probability involved may be interpreted in any of the various ways that numerical probability functions are interpreted. However, historically the notion of comparative conditional probability has been most closely associated with the notion of comparative evidential support. Moreover, it will be easier to motivate the proposed axioms if we give the comparative relations ≽ some specific interpretive reading. So, in this article I will treat the qualitative relations as representations of comparative evidential support relations, understood as a kind of comparative argument strength. Thus, each such qualitative relationship 'A|B ≽ C|D' will be read to say, "conclusion A is supported by the conjunction of premises B at least as strongly as conclusion C is supported by the conjunction of premises D". However, since the axiomatic treatment itself is purely formal, these same probabilistic relations may also be interpreted to represent other conditional probabilistic concepts, provided that conditional probability function (of the kind known as Popper functions) may also be so interpreted. For example, perhaps 'A|B ≽ C|D' may also be interpreted to represent some notion of comparative objective chance: "for systems in state , the chance of outcome A among those systems with attribute B is at least as great as the chance of outcome C among those with attribute D". Then the following representation theorems show that this non-numerical notion of comparative chance adequately captures all of the comparative probabilistic features embodied by numerical conditional chance functions. Under such an interpretation the logic explicated here provides a completely adequate treatment of chance without numbers.
Here is a bit of historical background to the logic of comparative probability relations of the sort explicated here. In his Treatise on Probability (1921) John Maynard Keynes develops a logic of evidential support that takes conditional probability functions as basic measures of argumentative support strength. The idea is that for some appropriate conditional probability function P, the conditional probability statement 'P[H | E] = r' means that the conjunction of premises E supports conclusion H with strength r. On Keynes' account the specific numerical values for support strengths are often of little importance, and indeed the "probability values" r assigned as the argument strengths for conditional probabilities P[H | E] need not be numbers at all. Rather, the Keynesian idea is that these "probabilities" are merely some partially ordered objects that are used to provide the partial ordering relationships among arguments in accord with their strengths. These partially ordered objects may be real numbers in some cases, but in other cases they may not be numbers at all -indeed, Keynes argues that in some cases they cannot be numbers. Whenever P[H 1 | E 1 ] > P[H 2 | E 2 ], the argument from premises E 1 to conclusion H 1 is taken to be stronger than the argument from premises E 2 to conclusion H 2 . The strongest arguments are the deductively valid ones -whenever E 1 |= H 1 (i.e. whenever E 1 deductively entails H 1 ), then no argument from premises E 2 to conclusion H 2 can be any stronger, so P[H 1 | E 1 ]  P[H 2 | E 2 ]. In that case the argument from E 1 to H 1 gets probability 1. Furthermore, Keynes holds that the comparative strengths of some argument pairs may be objectively incomparable. That is, Keynes argues that for some pairs of arguments H 1 |E 1 and H 2 |E 2 , neither P[
Taking his cue from Keynes, the mathematician Bernard Osgood Koopman developed a purely qualitative account of conditional probability (1940). Koopman axiomatized comparative conditional probabilistic relations ≽ with the goal of providing a more comprehensive account of Keynes' logic of comparative argument strength. Since then a number of researchers have proposed various axiomatizations of comparative probabilistic relations. Indeed, even before Koopman's work de Finetti (1937) had proposed qualitative comparative axioms for unconditional probabilities, where the basic notion A ≽ B represents "A is at least as probable as B". Most approaches (for both unconditional and conditional probabilities) have supposed that the primitive relation ≽ is a complete order -i.e. in the conditional-probability case it is usually assumed that for all A, B, C, and D, either A|B ≽ C|D or C|D ≽ A|B. Furthermore, none of the systems of qualitative conditional probabilities developed thus far correspond to the most general kind of conditional probability functions now available, the Popper functions. The version of qualitative conditional probability on offer in this article is more general than other accounts in both of these respects. The axioms will permit the comparative relations to be merely partial orders, and the comparative relations that satisfy the axioms below will correspond to the full range of those conditional probability functions known as Popper functions. Indeed, the comparative probabilistic relations that satisfy one version of the following axioms will turn out to be representationally richer than the quantitative conditional probability functions. 
The Popper-Field Conditional Probability Functions
In this section I'll specify a version of the axioms for Popper functions. This kind of conditional probability function is of interest in its own right. All of the more usual kinds of conditional probability functions are themselves Popper functions -i.e. they satisfy the axioms for Popper functions. But also among the Popper functions are conditional probability functions that make important use of conditionalizations on statements that have probability 0. Popper functions are especially useful for our purposes because they can represent all of the non-numerical comparative probability relations specified later. That is, for each non-numerical comparative probability relation, there is a Popper function that numerically yields the same comparative relationships; and every Popper function gives rise to a comparative relation that satisfies the axioms specified below for comparative probability relations.
To understand the relationship between Popper functions and classical conditional probability functions, think of it like this. Given any unconditional classical probability function P defined on sentences or propositions, conditional probability is usually defined as follows: whenever P The class of all Popper functions is a little more general than this. For, among the Popper functions are probability functions that possess another feature that gives them a richer structure than the classical conditional probability functions. Here is how that more general feature works. For a given Popper function P, if we hold the condition statement B fixed, then the function P[ | B] always behaves precisely like a classical probability function. However, whenever a statement C has 0 probability on B, P[C | B] = 0, the probability function resulting from P by now holding this conjunction (CB) fixed, P[ | (CB)], may behave like an entirely different classical probability function. In general, a Popper function behaves like a ranked hierarchy of classical probability functions, where the transition from a classical probability function at one level in the hierarchy (the statement 'B' level) to a new classical probability function at a lower level in the hierarchy (the statement '(CB)' level) is induced by conditionalization on a statement that has probability 0 at that higher (statement B) level. This provides a generalization of the usual conception of conditional probability.
This generalization of classical probability is useful for cases of the following sort. The probability that a randomly selected point will lie within a specific region of three-dimensional space described by A, given that it lies somewhere within a larger three-dimensional region described by B, may have some well-defined non-zero value -e.g. P[A | B] = 3/4. However, the probability that this same randomly selected point will lie precisely on the part of a plane described by C within the region described by B should presumably be 0, so we have 0 = P[C | B] = P[(AC) | B]. However, given that this randomly selected point does indeed lie within the plane described by C within the region described by B, the probability that it lies within the region described by A (which, say, contains half of the plane described by C) may be perfectly well-defined: P[A | (CB)] = 1/2. In addition, the probability that this randomly selected point will lie on the line segment described by D within the plane described by C should also presumably be 0, so we again have a situation where 0 = P[D | (CB)] = P[(AD) | (CB)]. However, given that this randomly selected point does lie within the line segment described by D within the plane described by C within the region described by B, the probability that it lies in the region described by A (which, say, contains two-thirds of line segment described by D) may again be perfectly well-defined: P[A | (D(CB))] = 2/3. So, the general idea underlying the Popper functions is that a specific conditional probability function (a Popper function) may consist of a ranked hierarchy of classical probability functions, where conditionalizations on specific probability 0 statements at one level of the hierarchy can induce a transition to another perfectly good classical probability function defined at a lower level of the hierarchy.
One way that a logic of evidential support may employ this ranked structure is to place some sub-classes of alternative hypotheses at ranks below other alternatives. Alternative hypotheses at the lower rank only come into play as live options (having non-zero probability) when evidential events occur that have probability 0 (i.e. zero likelihoods) according to all alternative hypotheses at higher ranks. Such evidential events refute all of the higher ranked hypotheses, and thereby induce a shift to a new sub-class of alternative hypotheses that now rate as available (non-zero probability) options. Thus, the additional structure carried by Popper functions may provide a useful tool for modeling some aspects of hypothesis evaluation not captured by classical conditional probability functions.
The logic of the Popper functions has one other feature that may be particularly attractive to philosophical logicians. It provides a kind of generalized logic of evidential support that need not presuppose a pre-defined formal deductive logic. Rather, a relation that's equivalent to classical deductive entailment falls out of the probabilistic logic as a special case. Thus, a probabilistic logic of this sort is autonomous in that it need not pre-suppose classical deductive logic. It will turn out that the logic of comparative conditional probability also has this feature. It is a generalized logic of evidential support that need not presuppose a pre-defined formal deductive logic. Rather, a relation that's equivalent to classical deductive entailment will emerge from the logic of comparative support as a special case.
Various axiomatizations of the Popper functions are available. Following is an especially spare version.
2 This version does not presuppose a pre-defined notion of logical entailment, nor are logically equivalent sentences assumed to be inter-substitutable, nor are logically equivalent sentences assumed to have the same probability values. Rather, a notion of logical entailment that is equivalent to the classical notion of logical entailment is derivable from these axioms, and the substitutivity of logically equivalent sentences may be proved from these axioms. Thus, this approach to axiomatizing probability is autonomous with respect to classical deductive logic. Furthermore, these probability functions are only assumed to range over some real numbersperhaps negative, and perhaps much greater than 1. Then it can be proved that all of these probabilities must range between 0 and 1.
Let L be a language having the syntax of sentential logic. A Popper function is any function P from pairs of sentences of L to the real numbers (not necessarily restricted between 0 and 1) such that:
(non-triviality) and for all sentences A, B, C,
(The subscript 'P' stands for " Popper function".) This axiomatization shows that extremely weak conditions suffice to characterize the Popper functions. The following rules are then derivable as theorems (where 'B |= A' abbreviates "B logically entails A" in the classical deductive sense). 4 (The subscripts 'C' on the following rules stand for "Classical Logic", because most of these rules depend on some pre-defined notion of classical logical entailment.)
Let L be a language having the syntax of sentential logic. Each Popper function is a function P  from pairs of sentences of L to the real numbers such that for all sentences A, B, and C: 0 C . if |= ~A and |= B (i.e. ~A is a contradiction and B is a tautology), then P[
The axioms 0 C -5 C are derivable from axioms 0 P -5 P , and vice versa. Thus, these latter rules can be used as an alternative (easier to use) axiomatization of the Popper functions. All of the usual classical theorems of probability theory are easily derived from these C-axioms. (E.g. it can be shown that logically equivalent sentences must have the same probability.)
Notice that the conditionalization axiom (4 C and 4 P ) is more generous than is usually provided for by classical axiomatizations of probability. In cases where P[C | B] = 0 (so P[(AC) | B] = 0 as well), the term P[A | (CB)] is permitted to take on a value between 0 and 1, whereas on the usual axiomatizations P[A | (CB)] would either remain undefined or be defined as equal to 1. This feature of conditionalization permits Popper functions to behave as sequentially ranked hierarchies of classical probability functions, where conditionalization on a sentence that has probability 0 at one rank drops the function down to a new classical probability function at a lower rank; and where that new function continues to behave classically unless conditionalized on some sentence that has probability 0 at that rank, in which case the function drops yet again to a new classical probability function at a yet lower rank; …, etc. Finally, the very bottom rank consists of logical contradictions, perhaps together with other sentences that "behave like logical contradictions" -where, to say that a sentence D "behaves like a logical contradiction" means that every sentence has probability 1 when conditionalized on D. important if they are to be used as evidential support functions that apply to a language in which scientific hypotheses and theories are formulated. Hartry Field (1977) Let L 0 be a language with the syntax for predicate logic (with identity), and consider a class of languages L that contains L 0 together with name-extensions of L 0 drawn from a countable set of new names -i.e., all languages in L are just like L 0 but have some finite or countably infinite number of names not contained in L 0 . Define a PF-class to be a set of functions M such that each one of them, P  , assigns real numbers (not necessarily between 0 and 1) to pairs of sentences of its language (which is one of the languages in L) so as to satisfy axioms 0 P -5 P together with the following axioms: For all sentences C, formulas Fx with only x free, and names c 1 , ..., c m in P  's language,
, then there is a function P  in M defined on a name extension of P  's language that agrees with P  on its language such that for some names e 1 , ..., e n in P  's language r  P This is just a way of specifying how the quantifier "all" is supposed to work in a probabilistic logic, and of doing so in a way that does not presupposed classical deductive logic. Rule 6 P says that conjunctions of instances are always at least as probable as a universally quantified sentence. Intuitively this should hold because xFx should logically entail all instances of the form ((Fc 1 Fc 2 )...Fc m ), and entailed sentences should be at least as probable as the sentence that entails them.
The typical truth-value semantic for the universal quantifier  says that xFx is true on a truthvalue assignment T  (i.e. T  [xFx] holds) just in case for every possible truth-value assignment T  that's just like assignment T  except that T  extends T  to truth-values involving additional new names, e 1 , e 2 , etc., (by applying those new names to additional objects in the object-domain of the interpretation), all of the sentences Fe 1 , Fe 2 , etc. turn out true on the extended assignment T  (i.e. T  [Fe i ] holds for all of the new names e i ). Rule 7 p captures the same idea, but applied to probability functions P  and their name extensions P  (instead of truth-value assignments T  and their name extensions T  ). The only difference is that for probability assignments we want some name extensions to suffice to bring the probabilities of the conjunctions, ((Fe 1 Fe 2 )...Fe n ), arbitrarily close to the probability of xFx for sufficiently large numbers of names (for sufficiently large values of n). Thus, we require that function P  be extendable to functions P  (among a class of such functions M) such that for any value of r greater than P  [xFx | B], there is some name extension P  (among the name extensions of P  in class M) such that for enough of its names we have
. So, in order to get the logic of the quantifiers to work in much the same way that it works for a truth-value semantics, we specify each Popper-Field function in terms of a class of related functions -a function P  together with a so-called PF-class M of its name extensions. Then, finally, the class of all Popper-Field functions on a language (and its name extensions) for predicate logic is just the class PF that consists of all such functions P  , including those functions P  (in PF-classes M) that agree with them but also employ additional names.
One can prove that each of the above theorems 0 C -5 C holds for each Popper-Field function P  (in the class PF of all such functions) on a language for predicate logic, where now the logical entailment relation, |=, in theorems 0 C -5 C is logical entailment for predicate logic (with identity). Furthermore, theorems 0 C -5 C suffice to prove each of the axioms for the Popper-Field functions (with the exception of axiom 7 P , which may be added to 0 C -5 C as a separate axiom, if desired). So, one may treat theorems 0 C -5 C as an alternative way to axiomatize the same collection of Popper-Field functions -a way that shows directly how the Popper-Field functions may be gotten by extending classical deductive logic.
Those who propose to use Popper-Field functions (or any other kinds of probability functions) as confirmation functions in a Bayesian logic of evidential support are often challenged to give an account of where the numerical degrees of support come from. What do these probabilistic numbers mean or represent? Subjectivist Bayesians may answer this question in terms of betting functions and Dutch book theorems -the idea being that confirmation functions are beliefstrength functions, and that the numerical values of belief-strength functions represent ideally rational betting quotients. However, if a confirmation theorist holds the sort of logical account of confirmation functions endorsed by Keynes, an account wherein confirmation functions represent argument strengths, then another sort of answer to the "where do the numbers come from, and what do they represent?" question makes better sense -an answer via a representation theorem. On this approach the idea is that there is a deeper underlying qualitative logic of comparative evidential support, and the numerical probabilities provided by Popper-Field functions are merely a convenient representation of this deeper logic. I now proceed to specify the axioms for this deeper logic of comparative support. And I'll show how the Popper-Field functions represent this deeper qualitative logic of evidential support. 
Towards the Logic of Comparative Evidential Support: the Proto-Support Relations
A comparative support relation ≽ is a relation among pairs of sentence pairs that satisfies axioms that seem appropriate to an intuitive conception of comparative argument strength. Associated with each relation ≽ are several related relations that may be defined in terms of it. Here is a list of these related relations, together with their formal definitions in terms of the primitive support relation ≽, and together with an appropriate informal reading of each. It will turn out that the axioms for a relation ≽ make the corresponding supportive entailment relation  satisfy the rules for a well-known kind of non-monotonic conditional called a rational consequence relation. Indeed, each of the rational consequence relations turns out to be represented by some supportive entailment relation (for some relation ≽ that satisfies the axioms below). Furthermore, classical logical entailment will turn out to be extensionally equivalent to supportive entailment for every relation ≽.
7
With these definitions in place we are now ready to specify the axioms for the comparative support relations. We begin with a class of relations that is a bit too broad -relations that satisfy some probability-like rules, but which are not sufficiently constrained so as to always behave like probabilistic comparisons.
Let L be a language having the syntax of sentential logic. Each proto-support relation ≽ is a binary relation between pairs of sentences that satisfies the following axioms: 
If H|(EF) ≽ A|B and H|(E~F) ≽ A|B , then H|E ≽ A|B (alternate presumption)* [Probabilistically this axiom follows from additivity together with conditionalization -i.e. since P[H | E] = P[H | EF]  P[F | E] + P[H | E~F]  (1  P[F | E]), if both P[H | EF]  r and P[H | E~F]  r, then P[H | E]
 r. Axiom 8 is a qualitative version of this result. This axiom can be proved from the other axioms if the relation ≽ is assumed to be completely comparable rather than merely a partial order relation; the asterisks, '*', on the name of this axiom is there as a reminder of its derivability in the presence of completeness.]
All relations ≽ that satisfy these axioms are weak partial orders -i.e. they are transitive and reflexive. Transitivity is guaranteed by axiom 2; reflexivity, H|E ≽ H|E, follows easily from axioms 4.1, 4.2, and 2. I call the relations that satisfy these axioms proto-support relations because the axioms still need a bit of strengthening to rule out some relations ≽ that fail to fully behave as comparative support relations should. I'll say more about that later.
The asterisks on the name of axiom 8 is there to indicate that it follows from the other axioms whenever the relation ≽  is also complete -i.e. whenever, for all pairs of sentence pairs, the following complete comparability rule also holds (or is added as an additional axiom) for relation ≽:
either H 1 |E 1 ≽ H 2 |E 2 or H 2 |E 2 ≽ H 1 |E 1 (complete comparability).
This rule would require that all argument pairs are comparable in strength: H 1 |E 1 ≭ H 2 |E 2 . Any relation ≽ that satisfies the above axioms together with complete comparability is a weak order relation rather than merely a weak partial order relation.
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Notice that none of these axioms draws on the notion of logical entailment. Rather, the logic of the proto-support relations is autonomous from classical logic, just as the axiomatization of the Popper functions provided earlier is autonomous. A notion of logical entailment falls out of the logic of the proto-support relations as a special case, and it then turns out to be extensionally equivalent to the classical notion of logical entailment:
Definition: B logically-supportively-entails A (abbreviated 'B |=> A') just in case for all proto-support relations ≽, B  A (i.e. A|B ≽ B|B).
Theorem: B |=> A if and only if B |= A (i.e. iff B classically logically entails A).
This theorem takes some work to prove, but once obtained, the following rules also result: Furthermore, the system of axioms gotten by replacing axioms 3, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, and 5.2 with these three rules can be used to derive axioms 3-5.2, and so provides an equivalent alternative axiomatization of the proto-support relations. 
* This rule may not seem as intuitively compelling as the others, so I forego it here. Later we will want to require that comparative support relations be extendable it completely comparable relations. The rule of subdivision is derivable from axioms 1-7.4 in the presence of complete comparability. 9 To extend the proto-support relations to predicate logic (with identity), we may do something analogous to the treatment that extend to Popper functions to the Popper-Field functions.
Let L 0 be a language with the syntax for predicate logic (with identity), and consider a class of languages L that contains L 0 together with name-extensions of L 0 drawn from a countable set of new names. Define a PS-class for proto-support relations to be a set M of relations such that each of them, ≽  , satisfy axioms 0-9 together with the following axioms: For all sentences C, formulas Fx with only x free, and names c 1 , ..., c m in ≽  's language: (i) ( (Fc 1 Fc 2 ) The axioms that constrain the "full" comparative support relations (which is a restricted subset of the proto-support relations) will turn out to be probabilistically complete in the sense that each full comparative support relation ≽ (that satisfies the above axioms plus a bit more) will be representable by a Popper function P whose corresponding comparative relation agrees with ≽ (or at least "agrees very nearly"). However, the axioms for the proto-support relations are not probabilistically complete. It turns out that some proto-support relations are not be probabilitylike enough to be representable by any of the Popper functions.
The proto-support relations are sufficiently strong to provide comparative forms of Bayes' theorem. (iii)if for every ≽  in M a name extension of ≽  that agrees with ≽  on its language, ((Fe 1 Fe 2 )...Fe n )|B ≻  A|C for all n and names e 1 , ..., e n in ≽  's language, then xFx ≽  A|C. (When ≽  satisfies the complete comparability rule, (iii) is derivable from (ii).) Now define the class PS of all proto-support functions on languages in L to be the union of all such PS-classes M. (Axiom (iii) follows from axiom (ii) if the relation ≽  is complete.) To include identity, require members of PS to also satisfy the following two axioms:
Fb | ((Fa  b=a)  B) ≽  B|B. Given these axioms, the above definition of logically-supportive-entailment and the theorem that it coincides with classical logical entailment applies to predicate logic (with identity). Then {3}-{5} and all of the following results apply to predicate logic (with identity).
Here is a second Bayesian result that derives from the logic of proto-support relations. 
The Comparative Evidential Support Relations and their Probabilistic Representations
Consider the following additional rules. We will employ these rules as axioms to characterize classes of comparative support relations that behave like comparisons between conditional probability values.
9. H 1 |E 1 ≽ H 2 |E 2 or H 2 |E 2 ≽ H 1 |E 1 (complete comparability) [A relation ≽ that satisfies this rule is a weak order rather than merely a partial order; such a relation ≽ compares the strength of each possible argument to each of the others.]
10. For each integer m  2 there is an integer n  m such that for n sentences S 1 , ..., S n and some sentence G: G  / ~S 1 , and for all distinct i, j, G  ~(S i ·S j ) and S i |G  S j |G.
(existence of arbitrarily large equal-partitions) [When such sentences G and n-tuples of sentences S i exist for a relation ≽, it can be shown that:
, and also (G(S 1 ...S n ))  (S 1 ...S n ). Thus, for each n, ≽ has an exclusive and exhaustive equal-partition based on (G(S 1 ...S n )). These partitions can be used to provide approximate "probabilistic values" for the strengths of arguments H|E:
we effectively get a probabilistic approximation: (m+1)/n  P[H | E]  m/n. For arbitrarily large partitions (for arbitrarily large values of n) we get arbitrarily close probabilistic bounds on the strength of each argument.] 10 + . If H 1 |E 1 ≻ H 2 |E 2 , then for some n  2 there are n sentences S 1 , ..., S n and a sentence F such that: F  / ~S 1 , and for distinct i, j, F  ~(S i ·S j ) and S i |F  S j |F, and F  (S 1 ...S n ) , and for some m of them, H 1 |E 1 ≻ (S 1 …S m )|F ≻ H 2 |E 2 .
(Archimedean equalpartitions) [Rule 10 + can be shown to imply rule 10, given the other axioms. In addition, 10 + supplies a kind of "Archimedean condition": it requires that whenever H 1 |E 1 ≻ H 2 |E 2, there is an equal-partition that, for sufficiently large n, squeezes a "strength comparison" between H 1 |E 1 and H 2 |E 2 , which forces these two arguments to exhibit distinct probabilistically strength values:
. Those comparative support relations that satisfy rules 9 and 10 but fail to satisfy 10 + must permit some argument pairs such that H 1 |E 1 ≻ H 2 |E 2 to be infinitesimally close together in comparative strength -no equal-partition argument can be fitted between H 1 |E 1 and H 2 |E 2 .] Rule 10 + implies rule 10 (given the other axioms). Rule 10 together with the other axioms is equivalent to the following slightly stronger claim (which could be used in place of rule 10): 10 * . For each integer m  2 there is an integer n  m such that for n sentences S 1 , ..., S n and some sentence F:
Here is an intuitive example of statements that satisfy rule 10 * . Let statement F describe a completely fair lottery consisting of exactly n tickets. Each of the sentences S i says "ticket i will win". F says (supportively entails, and may even logically entail):
(1) "at least one ticket will win": so F  (S 1 …S n ); (2) "no two tickets will win": so F  ~(S i S j ), for each distinct pair of claims S i and S j ; (3) "each ticket has the same chance of winning" (so, the argument from F provides exactly the same support for the claim "ticket i will win" as for the claim "ticket j will win"): S i |F  S j |F for each distinct pair of claims S i and S j . (Furthermore, we suppose that F does not supportively entail "ticket 1 won't win", i.e. F  / ~S 1 , which formally reduces to F|F ≻ ~S 1 |F; this eliminates the possibility that F behaves like a contradiction, saying both that "none of the tickets wins" and that "one of the tickets will win").
We might have just required all comparative support relations of interest to satisfy rule 10 (or 10 * ). This would be an intuitively rather plausible requirement -it would merely require that the language of each relation ≽ have the ability to describe various such lotteries for arbitrarily large finite numbers of tickets. (Presumable our own language can do that.) There is no requirement that such lotteries actually exist -rule 10 (and 10 * ) is only about the comparative support strength implications of such lottery descriptions G (and F), not about the truth of these claims. Nevertheless, we won't require all comparative support relations to contain such lottery descriptions. Rather, it will suffice for our purposes that all such relations merely be extendable to relations that contain such lottery descriptions (or similar rule 10 satisfying statements). I'll say more about that momentarily. Now, consider all of the proto-support relations -i.e. all those relations that satisfy axioms 0-8. Some of these relations also (already) satisfy one or more of the additional rules, 9, and 10 or 10 + . I'll assign names to special classes of these relations. But before doing that I need to introduce one additional idea.
It is distinctly desirable that a logic of comparative evidential support not require every argument to be determinately comparable in strength to every other argument. For instance, where H 1 and H 2 are alternative cosmological theories, there may be no fact of the matter as to whether a tautology T supports one of them more or less strongly than the other, so we want it to be possible for incomparability to hold between them, H 1 |T ≍  H 2 |T, contra rule 9. Rather, only certain additional considerations (both evidential considers, E, and broadly empirical arguments and background knowledge, B) will yield meaningful comparisons of argumentative support strength (e.g. perhaps H 1 |B ≻  H 2 |B, and then, in some cases where E|(H 2 B) ≻  E|(H 1 B), we may have H 2 |(EB) ≻  H 1 |(EB)). Indeed, there are lots of cases where distinct arguments are simply incomparable in strength, where neither is distinctly stronger than the other, but where they are not definitely equal in strength either. Thus, in many cases a comparative support relation should quite legitimately violate the complete comparability rule. However, I will argue that each legitimate comparative support relation should in principle be extendable to a complete relation. I'll provide the argument for that in a moment. Let's first define the relevant notion of extendability.
Definition: A proto-support relation ≽  is extendable to a proto-support relation ≽  just when the language of ≽  contains the language of ≽  (i.e. contains the same syntactic expressions, and perhaps additional expressions as well) and the following two conditions hold:
(1) whenever A|B ≻  C|D, then also A|B ≻  C|D; (2) whenever A|B   C|D, then also A|B   C|D.
The idea is that when ≽  is extendable to ≽  , all argument pairs that are comparable according to ≽  must also compare in the same way according to ≽  . However, the language on which ≽  expresses and compares arguments may be broader than the language for ≽  , and ≽  may compare argument pairs not considered to be comparable according ≽  . 10 In a moment I will argue that although it is implausibly strong to require comparative support relations to be complete (to compare all argument pairs), it is quite reasonable to require each comparative support relation to be extendable to a complete relation. But before discussing that, let's now 10 This definition counts each relation ≽  as a trivial extension of itself. It also permits ≽  to be defined on precisely the same language as ≽  , and to merely extend ≽  by comparing some arguments that are incomparable according to ≽  . More generally, ≽  may also include comparisons among sentences not expressible in the syntax of the language of ≽  . Also notice that the relationship between ≽  and an extension of it ≽  is purely syntactic. There is no presumption that a relation ≽  and an extension of it ≽  have to be associated with the same meaning assignments to the sentences they share. assign names to those classes of comparative support relations that will play an important role throughout the remainder of the discussion. Given that rule 10 + implies rule 10 (and that each relation counts as a trivial extension of itself), all of the more specific kinds of comparative support relations specified by clauses 1-3 count as comparative support relations as specified by clause 4. Furthermore, each completeArchimedean relation is a complete relation (as specified by 2), and also counts as a potentiallyArchimedean relation (as specified by 3). However, some complete relations are not potentiallyArchimedean relations (we'll see an example later). Thus, each relation of the kind specified by a lower-numbered clause is also among the class of relations specified by a higher-numbered clause, but with the single exception that some complete relations are not potentiallyArchimedean relations. Furthermore, each class of relations specified by higher-numbered clauses contains some relations that don't satisfy the more restrictive conditions of the lowernumbered clauses.
Definitions of Classes of
As I've already suggested, the requirement that a comparative support relation be complete is much too strong. However, the complete relations are interesting because they act exactly like comparisons of conditional probabilities. Indeed, each complete relation corresponds to (is modeled by) a unique Popper function, whereas an incomplete relation that merely extendable to complete relation will often correspond to (i.e. be modeled by) a large class of Popper functions, where each Popper function in the class is an equally good model of the ordering among argument pairs specified by the comparative support relation it represents. Here is a precise statement of the way in which Popper functions can represent the various kinds of comparative support relations specified in the previous definition. but it turns out that some of the non-Archimedean relations capture intuitively plausible cases where some arguments should indeed be only infinitesimally stronger than some others. I'll describe an example in a moment.) So, although the complete relations have all of the benefits of conditional probability functions, as representations of argument strength they also have the same drawbacks; they must compare argument pairs that really should be incomparable in strength.
Representation Theorems
The proto-support relations commonly take a wide array of argument pairs to be incomparable in strength. Among them, I've only deemed those relations that can at least in principle be extended to complete relations (which provide definite strength comparisons between all argument pairs) to count as full-fledged comparative support relation. To see that this is a plausible constraint, consider what a proto-support relation ≽  must be like for it to fail to be extendable to a complete relation. Extendability is a purely syntactic requirement. That is, an extension ≽  of a relation ≽  need not take on any of the meanings that one might have associated with the sentences of ≽  . Rather, an extension ≽  of ≽  is only required to agree with the definite comparisons between formal sentences already engendered by ≽  , and to do so while continuing to satisfy the (syntactically specified) axioms 0-8. So, a proto-support relation ≽  can only fail to be extendable to a complete relation provided that no such complete extension can satisfy the syntactic restrictions embodied by axioms 0-8. In that case the definite strength comparisons (those of form A|B ≻  C|D and E|F   G|H) already specified by ≽  must, in conjunction with axioms 0-8, require that some of the remaining argument pairs remain incomparability in strength, not because of what their premises and conclusions mean (semantically), but merely to avoid implying an explicit syntactic contradiction with the protosupport axioms. In other words, any proto-support relation for which there cannot possibly be a complete extension is will already have a kind of looming incoherence due to the syntactic argument forms of its definite argument strength comparisons; and it can only stave off explicit incoherence (via the derivation of an explicit contradiction) by forcing some of the remaining syntactic argument pairs to remain incomparable in strength. While it makes good sense to declare particular argument pairs to be incomparable in strength when based on what they say (i.e. based on their semantic content) there is no appropriate basis on which to compare their strength. But a legitimate comparative support relation should not fix definite strength comparisons among some arguments, and then declare the remaining arguments incomparable merely to avoid syntactic incoherence. The requirement of extendability to complete comparisons simply eliminates from consideration all those proto-support-strength relations that deign to be so parochial.
I have already argued that requiring a comparative support relation to satisfy rule 10 (or 10 * ) is completely innocuous. It would merely require the language of each relation to have the ability to describe various fair lotteries for finite numbers of tickets. (We can certainly do that in natural languages like English.) However, we are only requiring that comparative support relations satisfy the weaker constraint of being extendable to a language that describes lotteries (or similar equal-partitions) of this sort. This should raise no controversy. And now we have also seen why it is perfectly reasonable to require comparative support relations to also be extendable in principle to complete relations -i.e. to relations that satisfy rule 9. 
Conclusion
Bayesian confirmation theory represents evidential support for hypotheses in terms of conditional probability functions. But in real scientific contexts the strengths of plausibility arguments for various alternative hypotheses, as represented by prior probability assignments, are often vague and imprecise, and so not properly rendered by the kinds of precise numbers that conditional probability functions assign. Rather, prior probabilities are better represented by ranges of numerical values that capture the imprecision in assessments of how much more or less plausible one hypothesis is than another. Indeed, this problem of over-precision not only plagues the assignment of prior probabilities to hypotheses. In many cases the Bayesian likelihoods may also have rather vague values that are merely constrained within some bounds. This situation places the Bayesian approach to evidential support in the predicament of first proposing a probabilistic logic that assigns overly precise numerical values to argumentative support strengths, and then having to back off the over-precision by acknowledging that in many realistic applications the proper representation of evidential support should employ whole sets of conditional probability functions that represent ranges of reasonable values for the priors and the likelihoods.
The qualitative logic of comparative support described here provides a plausible rationale for the probabilistic Bayesian approach to evidential support. It suggests that the overly precise probabilistic confirmation functions are merely representational stand-ins for a deeper qualitative logic of comparative argument strengths captured by the comparative support relations. The representation theorem indicates that a comparative support relation will generally be represented by a set of conditional probability functions that spans ranges of numerical support strengths. For, the qualitative comparisons of argument strengths captured by a comparative support relation will often be represented equally well by a host distinct conditional probability functions. The deeper qualitative logic has the ability to exhibit the kind of incomparability in strength among argument pairs that is ubiquitous among real comparisons between arguments. Each representing probability function has to assign numerical support values to all pairs of statements, even though many of those numerical assignments are merely a meaningless artifact of how probability functions are defined. I suggest that in a Bayesian confirmation theory we commonly employ these overly precise probabilistic representations because they are computationally easier to use than the qualitative comparative support relations they represent.
But, arguably, all of the features of evidential support that we really care about are captured by the comparative relationships among argument strengths realized by the comparative support relations and their logic. The probabilistic representation of the logic of evidential support is merely a convenience, an over-determined way to represent the deeper qualitative logic of comparative evidential support strengths. More generally, this logic of comparative support provides a foundation for the notion of evidential support that underlies both classical deductive logic and probabilistic inductive logic.
